Philosophantasy: why Singer is wrong

Last time, in the first installment of this blog, we discussed the philosophical position of Peter Singer. Two quick refreshers on the type of argument that he espouses in The Life You Can Save (TLYCS): 

1. According to Singer, because there is no morally-relevant distinction between an action and the omission of that action (re: failure to complete that action), failing to help people in need of assistance is the same as doing harm unto them.
   
2. Our moral responsibility is to give and keep giving, as long as we aren’t giving up something nearly as important as saving someone suffering. On principle, this prescribes and posits a pretty substantive burden on the relatively affluent to give.

This week, I want to situate Singer’s philosophy within a broader framework of classical utilitarianism, which you are probably already familiar with, to some extent. Then, in order to challenge Singer, I think it worthwhile to understand and examine his account vis-à-vis alternative philosophical paradigms and reveal some of its absurdities. 

Part A: Why Singer thinks he is right

Singer is a hedonistic utilitarian. What do these words mean? Well, the foundation of classical utilitarianism broadly is the principle of utility, which establishes that the right action is the one that maximizes pleasure while minimizing pain. In layman’s English, utilitarianism is what we mean when we say “the greatest good for the greatest number.” The utilitarian’s defining principle is derived from the recognition that there is a common principle from which an act can be considered right or wrong. 

Why is utility said common principle? 

According to utilitarians, maximization of pleasure is the only pursuit that is self-evident. The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, regarded as the father of modern utilitarianism, argues that ALL humans behave through “psychological egoism,” which suggests that every action must be motivated by self-interest. Even a religious ascetic maximizes by seeking the pleasure, whether intellectual, spiritual, or moral, of divine awakening. All experiences are based on the badness of pain and the goodness of pleasure. This is, as NYU Professor Thomas Nagel playfully points out in 1986, why we “have a reason, and not just an inclination, to refrain from putting [our] hand on a hot stove.” 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thus, if we operate hedonistically, meaning what ought to be pursued is pleasure and what ought to be avoided is pain, we should recognize that others’ pleasure is also worth maximizing. This point is where Singer’s account of stopping global suffering starts to surface. 

Hopefully this all makes sense! The TL;DR is kind of like – pleasure is intrinsically good and pain intrinsically evil because pleasure and pain are the only things universally worth pursuing and avoiding respectively for their own sake. 

Also, important PSA to not touch hot stoves because it would defeat the utilitarian’s major premise. 

Part B: Why I think Singer is probably wrong* 

Here, I have identified a few major objections to the hedonistic utilitarian and the maximization framework. They are quite complex, but I have tried to do a faithful job to distill them into palatable arguments from ivory tower mumbo jumbo. 

1: Supererogation

There is a relevant distinction between moral worth and moral obligation. Happiness, expected well-being, and pleasure may all very well be good, but there need not be an obligation to maximize them. Utilitarianism thus generates morally optional paths – “supererogatory duties.” To give an example, Steve Rogers throwing his body onto a live grenade to save his platoon would probably maximize utility. But it would also be “beyond his call of duty.” It would be, morally, and in all other senses, optional. 

2: Demandingness 

Utilitarianism generates excessive, or seemingly infinite demands. These are objectionable. Rahil aptly alluded to this type of objection in his comment to my last post. He writes that “you can’t force someone to uphold a responsibility unless you somehow compensate them for doing so or punish them for not doing so.” Funnily enough, utilitarianism attempts this exactly. 

Moral obligations are not absolute. If we are unlimited in our obligation to the entire world of suffering, we cannot maintain that obligation. Perhaps I am obligated to save a knowable victim of malnutrition with a few of my dollars because if I did not, they would die. Yet, am I also obligated to cure that person’s cataracts? Cataracts detract from their pleasure, and as a utility maximizer, I should. Right? It is so unclear where our obligations end, and accordingly, this is why Singer himself never advocates for a view this extreme. 

3: Overridingness 

If maximization is moral, and thus, a priori, what are we asking of individual agents? That they override their personal projects for the sake of maximization? It is important that I take care of my sister Addison. I endeavor to help her whenever I can and I am invested in her future. But, Addie is not the neediest sister on the planet. Heck, she’s probably not even the neediest sister at North or in the freshman class. If I adopted Singer’s account that I am morally responsible for minimizing the pain of others’ sisters, I would no longer pay my own sister much attention. Other people’s sisters need my sage wisdom. 

I think this objection raises a salient question of the erosion of agency altogether. Bernard Williams, a relativist who is deeply critical of utilitarianism, refers to this as an “attack on integrity.” Williams’ view is that utilitarianism asks that you weigh your commitments equally with everyone else’s in order to make a sufficiently utilitarian calculation. However, that means commitments become self-defeating. If my commitments are situated amongst everyone else’s, and able to be overridden by everyone else’s, my commitments would not be commitments at all.

*He is philosophically wrong. I would still recommend Feeding the Starving Children and donating to mutual aid organizations. Just not because I am ethically moved by Singer’s account. 

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This wraps up my thoughts on Singer. I think it’s a great starting point for lots of philosophical conversations about moral obligations and where they come from. The utilitarian view is obviously not meritless, but I do not think it is sufficient to guide action. However, if Singer is wrong, what’s the best way to address the problem of global poverty?