This particular post is brought to you per the request of Varun, who is interested in learning about the Australian philosopher Toby Ord. While Ord’s more recent works center around sweeping questions of the biggest existential threats to the human race, and our role in guaranteeing that mankind survives to see another generation, it’s his earlier work that Varun is most intrigued by. Specifically, Ord is a founding member of the Effective Altruism movement, which can be more accurately described as a school of thought which outlines a clear moral obligation to minimize suffering.
This week, we will focus on the work of Peter Singer, a Princeton bioethics professor and a seminal champion of charitable giving. Singer’s work influenced and arguably forms the ideological foundations for Effective Altruism. My goal in these blog posts is to provide a condensed and instructive summary of a given work or theory while adding my own reflection and commentary along the way.
Let’s philosophize!
Singer’s case for Effective Altruism is argued most comprehensively in The Life You Can Save (TLYCS), a text in which he espouses a rather simple view: citizens of affluent, developed nations have a pressing moral obligation to act against poverty in less affluent and developed countries.
His basic syllogism is as follows:
- Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.
- If it is in your power to prevent something bad, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong (immoral) not to do so.
- By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death abroad without sacrificing anything nearly as important.
- Ergo, if you do not donate, you are doing something wrong (immoral).
Relatively simple, right? After all, we can all round up our McDonald’s order a few cents to donate to sick children. We can give some of our spare change to the Salvation Army bellringers outside Wal-Mart. It doesn’t seem like a decision with any philosophical implications. Yet, there are serious, valuable questions that we can ask ourselves to prod at the reasons why we might characterize these sorts of actions as moral. For instance, why do we have a moral obligation to give money that we’ve earnt? Or, more broadly speaking, why is declining to give actively immoral?
Singer provides some incisive answers. Let’s explore a couple of central tenets that undergird Singer’s impassioned defense of giving. Some are more explicit in TLYCS, others more implied.
T1: There is no morally relevant distinction between acts and omissions.
Singer is of the belief that whether you actively perform an action or elect NOT to perform an action, both can generate moral culpability. Here, an example might help. A mother who intentionally starves their infant child and one who intentionally poisons theirs would be held equally morally culpable. In Singer’s view, starvation is no less objectionable simply because it is an omission of an action (feeding the child).
Ergo, in Singer’s case of the global poor, failing to help people in need of assistance is the same as doing harm unto them.
T2: The enormous, “earnt” affluence of the developed world is largely the product of a morally arbitrary “lottery of birth.”
Singer argues, the conditions of the place where you are born control your capacity to accumulate lots of wealth. Middle-class people in developed nations are advantaged by being born into good social and economic circumstances. In other places without this social capital (i.e. institutions, infrastructure, safety), no matter how hard you work, you will not be able to accumulate the same level of wealth. In other words, Warren Buffet’s mastery of selecting profitable stocks doesn’t do him any good in the sweatshops of Bangladesh.
Ergo, the wealthiest of the wealthy do bear some moral responsibilities to the less fortunate. Having the right to spend your money on a new leather jacket or iPhone for yourself does not speak to the question of morality. Ergo, to choose to spend money on excess and additional pleasures, rather than use that money to save human lives, can still be considered immoral.
T3: Revisit parts 2-4 of the syllogism outlined above. Our moral responsibility is to give, as long as we aren’t giving up something nearly as important as saving a kid in Senegal, for instance. But, taking this premise to its logical conclusion, this calls on us to give and give and give to the point where if we give a penny more, we’ll be sacrificing something nearly as important as the Senegalese child’s life. When we extrapolate Singer’s conclusion to its fullest extent, it becomes less tame and borders on the extreme.
However, it’s well worth noting that in practice, Singer is not advocating for this. To him, it is precisely because so few people give substantially that the need for so much more to be given is so great. A modest contribution from everyone who has the luxury to live comfortably is sufficient to lift most people out of extreme poverty.
Ergo, it’s a comparison. Either a lot of people must give a little or a few people must give a lot. Again, he emphasizes here the relative easiness with which the wealthiest people on the planet could eradicate global poverty.
Taken together, this brings us to Singer’s main frustration — the diffusion of responsibility. In TLYCS, Singer spends a lot of time and pages indicating that we are uniquely positioned to end global poverty. That in this particular moment, it is eminently possible to achieve sustainable development around the world. Yet, the world’s 26 richest people still have more wealth than the bottom 50% combined.
Are you convinced? What do you make of Singer’s conclusion? Is it really true that we, middle-class Americans in affluent Naperville, have any moral responsibility to end suffering around the world?
I’m not so sure.
Next time, we will refute Peter Singer and identify four philosophical objections to him, and the utilitarian framework for morality that he represents.